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1. Introduction
There is now a wide agreement that any stringent policy to reduce the concentration of
atmospheric concentrations of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) will call for a tremendous effort in
technological innovation. Therefore, at the frontier of climate and energy modelling research we
find the study of innovation dynamics. During the last decade the description of technical
change in integrated models for climate policy analysis has greatly improved.1 However, current
approaches still omit important elements that affect the dynamics of technical change and a
broader framework for analysing technical change is advocated. In particular, knowledge
externalities, although pervasive and extremely relevant in shaping innovation dynamics, are
usually not modelled.
The presence of market failures in the R&D sector, as emphasized by Griliches (1957, 1992), is
confirmed by the evidence, virtually found in all studies, that the social rate of return on R&D
expenditure is higher than the corresponding private rate2: estimates of the marginal social rate
of return to R&D investment range between 30 and 50 percent and of private return between 7
and 15 percent.
Spillovers are generally acknowledged as a fundamental aspect of technical change. The new
growth theory that has followed the seminal work of Romer (1990), has emphasised the
importance of international R&D knowledge spillovers (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, chs.11
and 12), and of both intrasectoral and intersectoral R&D knowledge spillovers in explaining
countries’ productivity (Jones, 1999; Li, 2000). Those contributions have stimulated the
development of a number of studies that estimate the importance of R&D spillovers among
firms, sectors or countries.3 Overall, the available empirical evidence supports the idea that
spillover effects are relevant and positive, even if, due to the variety of methodologies used,
estimates span over a wide range and their significance varies across studies.
When it comes to technologies for carbon emissions reduction, the difference between private
and social rate of return to R&D investment arises from a double externality: the presence of
both environmental and knowledge externalities. First, without a price on carbon that equates
the global and the private cost of emitting GHGs, all low emissions technologies are relatively

1

See Gillingham et al. (2008) for a recent overview of modelling methodology.
Among others Mansfield (1977, 1996), Jaffe (1986), Hall (1996), and Jones and Williams (1998).
3
An extensive review of the literature on spillovers at firm level can be found in Wieser (2005). Keller
(2004) reviews a large part of the literature on international spillovers.
2
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disadvantaged and the level of investment is therefore sub-optimal. Second, the private return to
investment in R&D is lower than the social return of investment due to the incomplete
appropriability of knowledge creation, thus pushing further away investments from the socially
optimal level.4
Many researchers that have worked on the optimal design of climate policy have stressed the
importance of studying climate policy in a second-best setting considering the double
externality. For example, Jaffe et al. (2005) proposes to use a portfolio made of a price signal to
correct for the environmental externality coupled with a policy to support investment in
technologies to reduce GHG emissions. The idea of complementing a stabilisation policy with
an R&D policy in order to address both externalities at once is instead opposed by Nordhaus
(2009). He argues that once the environmental externality is corrected, there are no evident
reasons to treat research in technologies to reduce GHG emissions differently from other kinds
of research that share the same characteristic of public good.
These doubts recently raised by Nordhaus (2009) clearly show that we are far from
understanding the optimal policy mix that reduces effectively and efficiently global warming
and climate change. This paper contributes to the literature by providing answers to three sets of
major policy questions using a sophisticated modelling environment in which it is possible to
study both the environmental and the knowledge externality.
These three sets of policy questions are the following. First, what is the optimal response, in
terms of investments in R&D (both in energy and non-energy technologies) of a policy to
stabilise the atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, when domestic intersectoral knowledge
spillovers are explicitly modelled? Can we expect that the stabilisation policy will drive the
economies closer to or farther from the socially optimal level of innovation? Second, what
would be the optimal amount of R&D spending and what would be the environmental
consequences of correcting only knowledge externalities? Third, what are the welfare
implications of addressing both environmental and knowledge externalities with a policy mix
that combines a stabilisation policy and R&D policies to support the optimal level of
innovation?
To provide an answer to these questions we have up-graded the hybrid Integrated Assessment
Model WITCH model by introducing knowledge spillovers between R&D investments to
increase energy efficiency (energy sector) and investments in knowledge creation to increase the

4

For an introduction to the literature on the double externality see Nordhaus (1990).
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productivity of the capital-labour aggregate (non-energy sector). We build upon previous work
in which knowledge dynamics of the WITCH model have been enriched by introducing directed
technical change in energy and non-energy inputs (Carraro, Massetti and Nicita, 2009) and we
abstract from international spillovers, which, as we show in a previous paper (Bosetti et al,
2008), have a modest role in shaping innovation dynamics.
Our work represents a pioneer attempt to introduce intersectoral spillovers in a complex
Integrated Assessment Model (IAM). IAMs typically do not explicitly describe market failures.
Until now, the few attempts to incorporate R&D spillovers in integrated models for the study of
climate policy have been confined to the inclusion of intrasectoral spillovers (Popp, 2006), and
international spillovers (e.g. Bosetti et al, 2008). However, empirical studies provide evidence
that intersectoral spillovers are extremely significant, as claimed by Wieser (2005) in his broad
review of the literature. Without intersectoral spillovers, models unrealistically assume that the
advance of technological frontiers of different sectors is mutually independent, omitting the
interactions among the different drivers of technical change.
By describing endogenous knowledge development dynamics in a second-best world, we are
able to produce insights on the widely debated question of the optimal portfolio of climate
policies. Moreover, our numerical assessments give quantitative foundations to a debate that has
been theoretical and not grounded on empirical basis so far.
Goulder and Schneider (1997) and Popp (2006) are the two main studies that analyse by means
of computational models with knowledge externalities a climate policy portfolio in which R&D
policy is coupled with a policy to reduce GHG emissions. However, there are major differences
among modelling assumptions that allow only marginal comparisons of results. First and
foremost Goulder and Schneider (1997) and Popp (2006) concentrate only on intrasectoral
spillovers. The WITCH model displays intrasectoral spillovers and in principle it is possible to
replicate the analysis of the earlier studies. We assume, however, that the intrasectoral
inefficiencies in knowledge creation are fully internalised and we instead concentrate on
intersectoral spillovers to incorporate the complex interaction of R&D dynamics between two
broad sectors that are affected differently by a policy to reduce GHG emissions. A further
difference with respect to Popp (2006) is that we do not exogenously impose that increased
spending in energy R&D crowds-out other kinds of R&D investments. By modelling
endogenous knowledge accumulation in the two knowledge stocks, we can describe the optimal
reallocation of resources to R&D in general, and between sectors. Our conclusions depart in a
number of ways from those of previous studies, as we explain in the following.

3
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Our analysis is both oriented to answer policy questions and to discuss modelling issues. We
aim to provide useful insights both to policy analysts and to the community of modellers.
Section 2 briefly describes the model and Section 3 presents calibration details. Section 4
describes the basic features of the Business as Usual scenario (BaU) and introduces historical
evidence on R&D patterns. Section 5 examines how incentives to invest in different kinds of
R&D are changed by a policy whose aim is to correct the global environmental externality that
arises from GHGs emissions. Section 6 explores the problem from the opposite angle and we
look at the implications for the environment of solving the sole knowledge externality. Section 7
studies the welfare implications of addressing both externalities. Finally, Section 8 introduces
the results of the sensitivity analysis. We conclude by assessing our results against earlier
findings in the literature, drawing policy implications and suggesting some patterns for further
research.

2. Model Description
2.1 Short model description
WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid) is a regional integrated assessment model
structured to provide normative information on the optimal responses of world economies to
climate damages (Bosetti et al. 2006, 2009b; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2007).
It is a hybrid model because it combines features of both top-down and bottom-up modelling:
the top-down component consists of an inter-temporal optimal growth model in which the
energy input of the aggregate production function has been integrated into a bottom-up like
description of the energy sector. WITCH’s top-down framework guarantees a coherent, fully
intertemporal allocation of investments, including those in the energy sector.
World countries are aggregated in twelve regions on the basis of geographic, economic and
technological vicinity (see Footnote 18 for a list of regions) which interact strategically on
global externalities: greenhouse gases, technological spillovers, and a common pool of
exhaustible natural resources.
WITCH contains a detailed representation of the energy sector, which allows the model to
produce a reasonable characterisation of future energy and technological scenarios and an
assessment of their compatibility with the goal of stabilising greenhouse gases concentrations.
In addition, by endogenously modelling fuel prices (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium), as well as

4
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 485 [2010]

the cost of storing the CO2 captured, the model can be used to evaluate the implication of
mitigation policies on the energy system in all its components.
In WITCH, emissions arise from fossil fuels used in the energy sector and from land use
changes that release carbon sequestered in biomasses and soils. Emissions of CH4, N2O, SLF
(short-lived fluorinated gases), LLF (long-lived fluorinated) and SO2 aerosols, which have a
cooling effect on temperature, are also identified. Since most of these gases are determined by
agricultural practices, the modelling relies on estimates for reference emissions, and a top-down
approach for mitigation supply curves.5
A climate module governs the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere and the temperature
response to growing GHGs concentrations. WITCH is also equipped with a damage function
that provides the feedback on the economy of global warming. However, in this study we do not
take a cost-benefit approach. We work in a “cost-minimisation” framework: with a given target
in terms of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere, we produce scenarios that minimise the
cost of achieving this target.
Endogenous technological dynamics are a key feature of WITCH. Dedicated R&D investments
increase the knowledge stock that governs energy efficiency. Learning-by-doing curves are used
to model cost dynamics for wind and solar capital costs. Both energy-efficiency R&D and
learning exhibit international spillovers. There are two backstop technologies: one in the
electricity sector and the other in the non-electricity sector. They necessitate dedicated
innovation investments to become competitive. In line with the most recent literature, the costs
of these backstop technologies are modelled through a so-called two-factor learning curve, in
which their price declines with investments in both dedicated R&D and technology diffusion.

2.2 Directed Technical Change with Intersectoral Spillovers
Gross output, GY (n, t ) ,6 in region n at time t is produced by combining energy services,

ES (n, t ) , and capital-labour services KLS (n, t ) in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)

5

Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) is estimated to offer sizeable low-cost
abatement potential. WITCH includes a baseline projection of land use CO2 emissions, as well as
estimates of the global potential and costs for reducing emissions from deforestation, assuming that all
tropical forest nations can join an emission trading system and have the capacity to implement REDD
programs. However, avoided deforestation is not a source of emissions reductions in the version of the
model that we used for this study.
6
Net output, Y (n, t ) , is obtained after accounting for the effects of climate change on production and the
expenditure for fuels and carbon capture and sequestration, as shown in the Appendix.
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nest:7

[

GY (n, t ) = TFP(n, t ) α Y (n ) ⋅ KLS

ρY

+ (1 − α Y ( n )) ⋅ ES (n, t )ρY

]

1 / ρY

(1)

Energy services and capital-labour services are obtained by aggregating capital-labour and
energy inputs with knowledge, which raises the productivity of raw inputs. As a proxy of
knowledge we use the cumulated stocks of R&D in the non-energy and energy sectors,
HKL (n, t ) and HE (n, t ) , respectively. The aggregation between raw inputs and knowledge is
assumed to follow a standard CES function:

[

ES (n, t ) = α ES (n )HE ( n, t )

ρ ES

[

KLS (n, t ) = α KLS (n )HKL( n, t )

+ (1 − α ES (n ))EN ( n, t )
ρ KLS

ρ ES

]

1 / ρ ES

+ (1 − α KLS (n ))KL( n, t )

ρ KLS

(2)

]

1 / ρ KLS

(3)

Calibration details are discussed in Section 3. The energy input EN (n, t ) , is produced in the
energy sector of the economy, and we refer to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007) for a more
detailed description. It basically consists of a series of nested CES functions that describe
energy supply and demand at different levels of aggregation. Capital and labour are aggregated
in a CES nest to produce the capital-labour raw input KL as follows:

[

KL(n, t ) = α KL (n )K C ( n, t ) ρ KL + (1 − α KL (n ))L( n, t ) ρ KL

]

1 / ρ KL

(4)

This formulation is supported by empirical evidence, as explained in Carraro, Massetti and
Nicita (2009).8

2.3 The R&D Sectors
The stocks of knowledge that each region can use to increase the productivity of capital-labour
and energy inputs is accrued by means of investments in R&D which are in turn enhanced by
knowledge spillovers. We account for two different types of knowledge spillovers. First,
knowledge is produced by standing on the shoulders of one nation's giants: investment in R&D
is combined with the stock of ideas already discovered and produces new knowledge which will
be the base for new discoveries in the following years (Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995; Popp, 2004).
These can be seen as intertemporal spillovers or, from another perspective, as intrasectoral,
lagged spillovers. Second, with this study we introduce intersectoral knowledge spillovers by

7
8

Where ρ = (σ − 1) / σ and σ is the elasticity of substitution.
See, among others: van der Werf (2007) and Chang (1994).
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including among the inputs of the idea generating process in one sector of knowledge
accumulated in the other sector. Accordingly, the production of new ideas, Z (n, t ) , in the
energy and non-energy sectors is modelled as follows:

Z HE (n, t ) = a I HE (n, t ) b HE (n, t ) c HKL(n, t ) d ,

(5)

Z HKL (n, t ) = f I HKL (n, t ) g HKL(n, t ) h HE (n, t ) i .

(6)

Where b + c + d < 1 and g + h + i < 1 . We assume that obsolescence makes a fraction δ of
past ideas not fruitful for the purpose of current innovation activity. As a consequence, the
stocks of knowledge evolve according to the following law of motion:

HE(n, t + 1 ) = HE (n, t )(1 − δ ) + Z HE (n, t )

(7)

HKL(n, t + 1 ) = HKL (n, t )(1 − δ ) + Z HKL (n, t )

(8)

The decision variables of the model are the investments in physical capital (for all different
technologies in the energy sector and for the domestic capital stock), the two types of R&D
investments and fuels expenditures for non-electric energy. As a consequence, the decision to
invest in energy R&D and non-energy R&D, and therefore total R&D, is endogenous. It is
optimally derived in each region by solving a dynamic open-loop game, which leads to a Nash
equilibrium.
We can either solve the model assuming that knowledge spillovers are an externality, which the
social planner that governs the economy is not able to control, or we can assume that society
fully internalises knowledge externalities and chooses the optimal path of R&D investments
accordingly. Our baseline scenario is constructed with the hypothesis that intertemporal (or
intrasectoral) spillovers are fully internalised while knowledge spills across sectors as an
externality. With this set-up we reproduce the sub-optimal investment in knowledge due to
intersectoral spillovers. We increase the realism of the model and introduce the possibility to
study climate policy in a second-best setting at regional level. This is not frequent in IAMs.

7
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3. Calibration
We depart from the standard version of the model9 and we adopt the same nesting structure of
the production function as in Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009), which introduce directed
technical change in WITCH. The elasticity between energy and capital-labour services, σ Y , is
set equal to 0.5 . The elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, σ KL , is equal to 0.8
for all regions with the exceptions of China and South Asia, for which we allow a greater
elasticity of substitution ( σ KL equal to 0.85). The elasticity of substitution between energy and
energy knowledge, σ ES , is set equal to 1.67, and the same value is used for the elasticity
between capital-labour and non-energy knowledge, σ KLS . For a detailed description of
empirical evidence supporting the chosen structure and parameters values we refer to Carraro,
Massetti and Nicita (2009).
The innovation possibility frontier has been calibrated for both the energy and the non-energy
sector using data from the empirical literature and adjusting the productivity parameter to
reproduce the R&D over GDP ratio at the base year (2005) and the dynamics observed in the
past.10 The initial stock of non-energy knowledge is built using the perpetual inventory model.
The value of the elasticity of new knowledge creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers is
set equal to 0.13. The choice of this value is based on the empirical work of Malerba, Mancuso
and Montobbio (2007), which estimate a spillover-augmented knowledge production function
analogous to the one we use in our work. They find that, at macro level, the elasticity of
knowledge creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers is comprised between 0.11 and 0.20.

4. The Business as Usual Scenario
Our Business as Usual scenario (BaU) is obtained as an open-loop Nash equilibrium in which
regions compete on the use of the environmental public good, on the use of fuels. A lagged,
global, learning-by-doing process governs the cost of wind and solar power plants.11

9

We use here the latest version of the model, WITCH08 as described in Bosetti et al (2009). In the latest
version, the model was updated withrecent data and revised estimates for future projection of population,
economic activity, energy consumptions and climate variables. The base calibration year has been set at
2005.
10
For an alternative approach see Bosetti et al (2008).
11

In Bosetti et al (2008) and in other versions of the model there are also international knowledge
spillovers in the Energy R&D sector. In this study we do not include international knowledge spillovers

8
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Table 1 summarises baseline trends of major variables and indicators of interest. Gross World
Product (GWP) increases over the entire century, starting from 44 trillion in 2005. It reaches
365 trillions in 2100, an almost nine-fold expansion. Population is exogenous, it grows at a
declining rate and reaches a plateau at the end of the century. Gains in energy efficiency explain
the reduction of emissions per unit of output. However, the strong expansion of output, coupled
with a slight increase in carbon intensity, offsets all efficiency gains and overall carbon
emissions increase throughout the century. This leads to a more than two-fold expansion of
GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere.

2005

2025

2045

2065

2085

2100

GWP (Trillions, 2005 USD)

44.21

87.94

151.81

228.00

306.46

359.30

World Population (billions)

6.51

8.01

9.02

9.53

9.51

8.96

Energy Intensity of Output (EJ/USD)

9.69

7.09

5.25

4.09

3.37

3.00

0.0183

0.0190

0.0201

0.0212

0.0221

0.0221

427

506

624

756

888

980

20.23

18.49

16.82

15.57

14.51

13.98

R&D expenditure (%GWP)

2.15

2.24

2.30

2.38

2.45

2.46

Non-energy R&D (%GWP)

2.13

2.22

2.28

2.36

2.43

2.44

0.0216

0.0189

0.0181

0.0240

0.0178

0.0174

1.01

0.84

0.79

0.76

0.73

0.71

Carbon Intensity of Primary Energy (GtonC/EJ)
Concentrations of GHG (ppmv)

Investment in final good capital(%GWP)

Energy Efficiency R&D (%GWP)
Energy R&D (%Total Investment in R&D)

Table 1. Baseline trend of major variables.

The model features an increasing path of R&D expenditure, as share of GWP. The fraction of
investment devoted to knowledge creation is increasing. The model features a slightly declining
path of energy R&D as share of GWP, an increasing path of non-energy R&D as share of GWP,
and a declining rate of energy to non-energy R&D investments, with a relative share of energy
R&D over total R&D declining from 0.73% to 0.61%. This is mainly explained by the fact that
fossil fuels tend to remain inexpensive in our baseline scenario and do not motivate energy
efficiency expenditures.
The optimal R&D investment path is in line with the historical trends of aggregate R&D. Figure
1 shows both the historical levels and the optimal trend of total R&D over GWP at world level.
but we still have international technological spillovers by means of a world learning curve for wind and
solar power plants.

9
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Historic data feature a slightly increasing trend over the past 10 years, starting from 2% in 1996
and reaching 2.1% in 2005. The same trend is predicted in the baseline scenario, with total R&D
over GDP increasing from 2.1% in 2005 to 2.5% at the end of the century.

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
Historical trend

0.5

BaU
0.0
1996

1999

2002

2005

2020

2035

2050

2065

2080

2095

Figure 1. R&D as percentage of GWP.

5. Addressing the environmental externality: The
Stabilisation Scenario
In this Section we explore how a policy to address the environmental externality only affects the
rate and direction of technical progress when intersectoral spillovers between energy and nonenergy R&D are modelled.
We correct the environmental externality by means of a policy to stabilise the level of GHGs
concentration in the atmosphere. We construct a stabilisation scenario by imposing a cap on
carbon emissions and by letting regions exchange carbon allowances on a global carbon market,
which equates marginal abatement costs globally. We choose here a “Contraction and
Convergence” allocation of carbon allowances.12 The path of emissions that we impose leads to
a stabilisation of CO2 concentrations at 550ppm CO2-eq target all GHGs included.

12

With the “Contraction and Convergence” rule, permits are first distributed in proportion to present
emissions and then the allocation progressively converges to an Equal-per-Capita allocation scheme,
which becomes the allocation rule from 2050 onwards. In the Equal-per-Capita rule permits are
distributed to regions in proportion to their population. Banking and borrowing of emissions allowances
are not allowed, but there is no restriction to international trade of permits.

10
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2005

2025

2045

2065

2085

2100

GWP (Trillions, 2005 USD)

44.21

87.09

149.26

221.43

301.26

358.44

World Population (billions)

6.51

8.01

9.02

9.53

9.51

8.96

Energy Intensity of Output (EJ/USD)

9.69

5.98

3.47

2.37

2.08

2.00

0.0183

0.0157

0.0107

0.0071

0.0056

0.0048

427

491

533

548

550

552

20.24

18.11

15.87

14.53

13.54

13.09

R&D expenditure (%GWP)

2.12

2.21

2.19

2.25

2.31

2.32

Non-energy R&D (%GWP)

2.09

2.14

2.13

2.19

2.25

2.27

0.0265

0.0304

0.0390

0.0740

0.0382

0.0356

1.25

1.38

1.78

1.80

1.65

1.54

Carbon Intensity of Primary Energy (GtonC/EJ)
Concentrations of GHG (ppmv)

Investment in final good capital(%GWP)

Energy Efficiency R&D (%GWP)
Energy R&D (%Total Investment in R&D)

Table 2. Stabilisation trends of major variables.

Table 2 displays the trend of key economic variables when the stabilisation policy is
implemented. The Gross World Product (GWP) over the whole optimisation interval 2005-2100
is lower than in the BaU scenario and discounted stabilisation policy costs are equivalent to
1.5% of BaU discounted GWP (using a 3% declining discount rate).13
The stabilisation policy has a remarkable impact on R&D dynamics, as the comparison between
Table 1 and Table 2 clearly shows. First, it induces much higher spending in energy efficiency
R&D, confirming results already established by a wide literature.14 Second, the stabilisation
policy induces a contraction of non-energy R&D spending, which is greater than the increase in
energy efficiency R&D and thus determines an overall contraction of R&D activity.
Reduced spending in non-energy R&D is due to: (1) a general contraction of economic activity
and (2) the fact that non-energy augmenting technical change is energy biased because of the
complementarity between the energy and the non-energy sector. With energy biased technical
change, an increase of non-energy R&D spending would increase energy use, and vice versa: by
reducing non-energy R&D spending it is possible to reduce energy demand, an important way
to cut emissions in a stabilisation scenario. It is therefore the stabilisation policy itself that

13

The WITCH model uses an aggregate damage function to describe the feedback of temperature
increase on GDP of each region. We thus account for the environmental benefits from the stabilisation
policy. Costs rise because the stabilisation target imposed here is stricter than what found as optimal in a
cost-benefit analysis with the WITCH model.
14
See for example Bosetti et al (2009a) for an analysis with the WITCH model.
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induces a contraction of the optimal level of R&D in the non-energy sector, and not the
competition from higher spending in energy R&D. Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009) widely
discussed this result and argued against the exogenous crowding-out hypothesis imposed in
Nordhaus (2002) and Popp (2004, 2006) on the grounds that, at least in the medium/long term,
societies are free to allocate the optimal amount of resources to knowledge creation. Recent
empirical evidence presented in Newell and Popp (2009) confirms this intuition, showing that
increased spending in energy R&D does not crowd out non-energy R&D.
By introducing a mutual link between the two knowledge frontiers, the stabilisation policy
triggers more complicated dynamics of both energy and non-energy R&D investments (see
equations 5 and 6). With respect to the model without intersectoral spillovers, the policyinduced positive shock to the stock of energy sector knowledge is transmitted to the non-energy
sector. It increases the marginal return to non-energy R&D and partially offsets the contraction
of R&D induced by the stabilisation policy. The final outcome is still a contraction of nonenergy R&D greater than the increment in energy R&D, confirming the result that the
stabilisation policy reduces knowledge accumulation even when endogenous spillovers are
modelled.
It is now interesting to check how far the level of aggregate R&D spending in a stabilization
policy is from the socially desirable one.15 Figure 2 and
Figure 3 show the time path of R&D investments – as percentage of GWP – when the
stabilisation policy is implemented and domestic knowledge externalities are internalised. The
optimal path of energy R&D investments is characterised by a declining trend over the century.
The converse is true for the optimal time path of non-energy R&D investments: the trend is
increasing because the labour becomes a scarce resource as population growth levels off by
mid-century. The difference between the optimal path and the second-best scenarios is striking.
If we consider energy R&D, the stabilisation policy brings R&D investments closer to the
socially optimal level. Remarkably, the jump from the level optimal in the BaU does not close
the R&D gap. Contrary

to what happens in energy R&D, the stabilisation policy brings

investments in non-energy R&D. Consequently, total R&D investment moves farther away
from the optimal level.

15

Here we define an optimal world as one in which the stabilisation policy is implemented to correct the
environmental externality and knowledge intersectoral externalities that are fully internalised in each
region. This should not be confused with the global optimum, because we do not internalise other
international externalities – e.g. on non-renewable resources use – and it is also not precisely a regional
optimum, because the stabilisation policy is designed by a global social planner.
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When only the environmental externality is addressed, there is ample space for R&D policies
that correct the knowledge externality in both sectors, jointly or separately. In Section 7 we
study the welfare implications of addressing both externalities. In the next section we address
how the sole knowledge externality affects the environmental externality.
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Figure 2. Investments in energy R&D/GWP.

2.50%
2.25%
2.00%
1.75%
1.50%
1.25%
1.00%
0.75%
0.50%
2005

2020
BaU

2035
Stabilization

2050

2065

2080

2095

Stabilization and optimal R&D

Figure 3. Investments in non-energy R&D/GWP.

6. Addressing the knowledge externality: R&D policies
In this section we study the implication of addressing only the knowledge externality by means
of R&D policies that reduce the gap between the private and the social return to knowledge
creation. R&D policies typically increase the attractiveness of knowledge creation by reducing
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the cost of innovation by means of subsidies or by increasing the reward to innovators with the
imposition of constraints to knowledge circulation. In this case, we are not interested in the
specificities of R&D policy, nor in its cost. In this section our aim is to assess the implications
for the environmental externality of a hypothetical R&D policy that internalises all knowledge
externalities in the energy sector first and then in both sectors. R&D policies that increase the
rate of technical change are often proposed to solve both environmental and knowledge market
failures. Here we provide a test of this proposition.
We consider two different R&D policies. First, only the externality of energy R&D is
internalised (R&D Policy Energy). Second, externalities in both sectors are internalised (R&D
Policy). Figure 4 and Figure 5 display the time path of the ratio of R&D when the policy is
implemented and R&D in the BaU for the energy and non-energy sectors. We record a sharp
increment of energy R&D spending when sectoral spillovers are internalised(i.e. when the social
planner acknowledges the contribution of energy knowledge to the production of non-energy
knowledge). Disentangling the exact forces at work is difficult because of productivity
feedbacks driven by the mutual link between the two innovation possibility frontiers and by the
complementarity of the two knowledge stocks.16 The R&D policy in the energy sector leads to
higher energy R&D spending, which increases the productivity of non-energy knowledge
creation (see the higher spending in non-energy R&D induced by the energy R&D policy in
Figure 5) and then in a positive productivity feedback for energy R&D investments.
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Figure 4. Ratio between investments in Energy R&D under different policy schemes and energy
16

In this respect, to test the existence of complementarity across the two sectors we performed an
exercise in which we measure the impact of a forced expansion of energy R&D investments on nonenergy R&D investments in the absence of spillovers. Energy R&D investments are required to be, in
each region, exactly equal to the optimal path determined when spillovers are fully internalised. We find
that non-energy R&D investments, respond positively to an increase of energy R&D, revealing a degree
of complementarity between the two knowledge stocks.
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R&D investments in BaU.
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Figure 5. Ratio between investments in non-energy R&D under different policy schemes and nonenergy R&D investments in BaU.

Both policies induce higher spending in R&D and an increment of both knowledge stocks with
respect to the BaU. The increment of knowledge (i.e. of productivity) in the two sectors has
opposite effects on energy demand: if from one side higher productivity of the energy input
determines a lower demand of energy, from the other side the increased productivity of the nonenergy input pushes for a higher demand of the complementary energy input. The final outcome
on energy demand is driven by the relative strength of these effects, which is ultimately
determined by the relative scarcity of the energy and non-energy inputs. In our BaU scenario, in
the long run, technical change is directed towards energy-biased knowledge because energy is
relatively more abundant than the capital-labour input. In both R&D Policy scenarios this effect
is enhanced and technical progress in the long run becomes more and more energy-biased; thus,
the demand of energy increases. The carbon intensity of energy remains largely unaffected
because regions behave non-cooperatively on the global commons and do not internalise the
environmental externality. Therefore, the R&D policies address the knowledge market failure
without controlling for the environmental one. The implications of the two scenarios on CO2
emissions are depicted in Figure 6.
Overall, R&D policies (including the one that internalises energy R&D externality) increase
voracity, i.e. the attitude of countries in a non-cooperative setting to grab as much as possible of
a common good, to preserve rate of return equalisation, thus exacerbating climate damage.
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Figure 6. World cumulative CO2 emissions (2005-2100).

7. Addressing both environmental and knowledge
externalities: policy costs and welfare comparison
The previous sections have shown that addressing only the knowledge externalities increases
the environmental problem and addressing only the environmental externality is, at best, not
sufficient to bring R&D investments to the socially desirable level. In fact, the environmental
policy exacerbates the knowledge externality in the non-energy sector. Therefore, at least in our
modelling context, policies that address both externalities appear to be socially desirable.
A first approach to evaluate the attractiveness of different policy mixes is to check their impact
on GWP. This is the most preferred method in climate policy analysis because it allows the
aggregation of benefits and costs without the need of a social welfare function.17 Figure 7 shows
that the energy R&D policy has a remarkable impact on stabilisation costs: combining an
energy R&D policy to the stabilisation policy would reduce costs to 0.14% of GDP for OECD
countries and would also cut them considerably in non-OECD ones. At global level,
stabilisation costs would be reduced to roughly one fourth of what they would be without the
energy R&D policy. As expected, the energy R&D policy has a greater impact on costs in
OCED countries, were the bulk of the knowledge externality is found. Figure 7 also shows that
internalising all knowledge externalities reduces stabilisation costs further, even if by a lesser
extent than the energy R&D policy. Stabilisation costs virtually disappear for OCED countries.
For non-OECD countries the reduction of costs is less pronounced, as expected, and at global

17

Stabilisation costs are measured as the discounted sum of year–by-year GWP differences between the
policy scenarios and the BaU scenario. It is expressed as a percentage of the BaU scenario GWP. As
mentioned before, we abstract here from the complex assessment of the costs of the R&D policy.
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level internalising non-energy R&D externalities reduces stabilisation costs of 0.1% of
discounted GWP.
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Figure 7. Discounted Stabilisation policy cost.

The fact that complementing the Stabilisation policy with an R&D policy brings a reduction of
stabilisation costs is in line with the findings of Goulder and Schneider (1997) and Popp (2006).
However, there are some important differences between the three models and the policies
examined. Goulder and Schneider (1997) focus on intrasectoral spillovers and find that an R&D
policy reduces stabilisation costs only if it addresses R&D externalities in all sectors. If
restricted only to sectors with low emissions, the R&D policy increases stabilisation costs. Popp
(2006) shows that higher spending in energy R&D reduces only marginally stabilisation costs
because it crowds out non-energy R&D investments. The crowding-out is exogenous because
Popp does not model the explicit knowledge accumulation in the non-energy sector. Contrary to
Popp (2006) we do not impose exogenous crowding-out assumptions because we model both
knowledge stocks. We find that a stabilisation policy together with an R&D policy targeted at
the only energy sector is significantly less costly than the stabilisation policy alone. We find that
energy R&D does not crowd-out non-energy R&D and, thanks to intersectoral spillovers, the
policy induced increase in energy efficiency R&D spills over to the non-energy sector,
contributing to knowledge accumulation and the reduction of knowledge externalities.
A more appropriate method to compare alternative policies is to rank them using regional
welfare – i.e. the discounted sum of log utility of consumption per capita.18 Table displays the
18

A global analysis would require a global welfare function which is subject to complex evaluations of
weighting schemes of regional welfares. The discount rate used is the pure rate of time preference. The
regions of the WITCH model are: CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New Zealand); USA; LACA (Latin
America, Mexico and Caribbean); WEURO (Western Europe); EEURO (Estern Europe); MENA (Middle
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relative regional preference ordering among the Stabilisation scenario, the Stabilisation R&D
Policy Energy, in which only the energy sector externality is internalised, and the Stabilisation
R&D Policy scenario, in which all knowledge externalities are internalised. Preferences are
ranked in decreasing order and the policy mix with the highest welfare is ranked number one.

OECD

non-OECD

USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ

TE

MENA

SSA

SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA

Stabilization

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

Stabilization R&D Policy Energy

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

2

1

Stabilization R&D Policy

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

2

1

2

Table 3. Welfare ranking of different policy mixes.

Addressing knowledge externalities is welfare enhancing for all regions, and for most of them
an R&D policy that targets externalities only for energy R&D is preferred to an R&D policy
that internalises all knowledge externalities. This result is important because it shows that it is
rational to pay special attention to energy R&D policies in a Stabilisation scenario. The idea that
once the environmental externalities are corrected, all kinds of R&D should be treated the same
is compelling, but it is valid only in a simplified setting, as in Nordhaus (2009). In our model we
find a different result for two main reasons. First, an R&D policy, which targets also the nonenergy sector increases the productivity of non-energy inputs and causes a higher demand of
energy – because technical change is energy biased. Second, the equilibrium of the WITCH
model is the result of an open-loop Nash game in which countries do not coordinate their
actions to achieve an optimum at planetary scale. Therefore, regions do not coordinate
themselves when they implement the R&D policy and look only at the national optimal level of
R&D spending. As a result, they increase the demand of energy beyond the globally optimal
level and the price of emissions permits rises: in our Stabilisation R&D Policy scenario the
carbon price is roughly 1% higher over the whole century than in the Stabilisation R&D Policy
Energy scenario. Countries with relatively higher carbon intensity suffer higher stabilisation
costs and see their welfare reduced, while Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SASIA) and
East Asia (EASIA), all net sellers of emissions allowances, gain from both a higher productivity
of the economy and a higher carbon price. This explains the results shown in Table.

East and North Africa); SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa); TE (Transition Economies);
SASIA (South Asia); CHINA (including Taiwan); EASIA (South East Asia); KOSAU (Korea, South
Africa, Australia).
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A final insight that we can draw from this enhanced version of the WITCH model with directed
technical change, is how estimates of stabilisation costs change if the constraints on emissions is
imposed on an economy in which investments in R&D are equal to the socially optimal level.
We find that the cost of the stabilisation policy is higher if the starting point is an economy in
which all knowledge externalities are internalised. In particular, not only stabilisation costs
increase in absolute value, as it is reasonable to expect in economies that are more efficient and
thus have higher output, but they are also higher in percentage terms as Figure 8 shows. The
reason is the non-linearity of marginal abatement costs: an economy that has no constraints on
emissions but starts with higher R&D investments and thus higher output, will have higher
emissions, and therefore higher marginal abatement costs.
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-1.33% -1.56%

-1.72%

-1.78%

WORLD

-2.05%

OECD
Stabilization

Non-OECD

Stabilization Optimal R&D

Figure 8 Discounted Stabilisation Policy Cost in second-best or optimal world.

8. Sensitivity analysis
In this section we present results of a sensitivity analysis on the elasticity of new knowledge
creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers, to check the robustness of the main findings of
our work. The value of the elasticity has been varied in a reasonable range around the central
value 0.135 .
The first result to test is the impact of the stabilisation policy on non-energy knowledge
accumulation. We find that the ratio of non-energy R&D investment in the Stabilisation
scenario to non-energy R&D investment in the BaU scenario is only minimally affected by
different assumptions on the elasticity of substitution (see Figure 9, where the central case is
depicted by a solid line).
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The second result that we test is the sharp increment of energy R&D investments when the
R&D policy is implemented. We can confirm that the R&D policy substantially increases the
optimal amount of energy R&D investments under a sufficiently large range of elasticity
parameters, as shown in Figure 10. The increment of spending in energy R&D caused by the
R&D policy remains remarkable, even for values of the elasticity of substitution that are at the
lower bound of empirical estimates.
We then consider the effect of implementing both climate and knowledge policies. As shown in
Figure 11 and in Figure 12 the higher the value of elasticity, the greater the impact is of
internalising knowledge externalities on both total R&D and on the costs of stabilisation. We
even find that for value of the elasticity greater than 0.135, GWP increases with respect to the
BaU when knowledge externalities are internalised.
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Figure 12 Discounted stabilisation policy costs,
with and without R&D policy.
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Finally we test the impact on emissions by internalising only knowledge externalities. As shown
in Figure 13 we find a positive correlation between emissions and the value of elasticity. We
also find that for all values of elasticities included in our analysis, implementing only one policy

Ratio of CO2 Emissions in BaU with R&D
Policy to CO2 Emissions in BaU.

to correct market failure in knowledge sector always increases emissions.
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Figure 13. Ratio of CO2 emissions in BaU with R&D policy to CO2 emissions in BaU.

9. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature by expanding our understanding of the optimal mix of
climate policies. In particular, the aim of this paper is to answer three policy questions that are
relevant for the design of climate policy. First, what is the optimal response, in terms of
investments in R&D of a policy to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of GHGs in a secondbest framework? Second, what would be the optimal amount of R&D spending in the energy
and non-energy sectors and what would be the environmental consequences of addressing only
the knowledge externality? Third, what are the welfare implications of a policy mix that
combines a stabilisation policy with R&D policies to support the optimal level of innovation?
We answer the above questions using an enhanced version of the WITCH model with directed
technical change in which we have explicitly modelled intersectoral spillovers. R&D
investments can be used to increase the productivity of the energy input and of non-energy
inputs. Knowledge spills from one sector to the other, contributing to the generation of new
ideas in a sector in which it was not originally accumulated.
We find that climate policy internalises only partially knowledge externalities in the energy
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sector and it even worsens market failures in the non-energy sector. This result confirms what
was already found by Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009) in a model without intersectoral
spillovers. Correcting the environmental externality alone has contrasting effects on the
knowledge externality. Given the relative size of the two sectors, the stabilisation policy induces
a lower amount of R&D spending than in the BaU. The answer to the first question is that the
stabilisation policy brings us farther from the optimal level of R&D spending. The stabilisation
policy thus increases the need for policies to correct for the knowledge externality instead of
reducing it.
When only the knowledge externalities are corrected, we find that voracity – i.e. the attitude of
countries to grab as much as possible of a common resource in a non-cooperative setting –
exacerbates the environmental externality. Higher productivity, without a specific control for
environmental externalities, is automatically translated into higher energy demand. Without any
incentive to decarbonise energy, this results in higher carbon emissions and increased global
warming. Interestingly, this happens also when we correct externalities only in the energy
sector, enhancing the overall energy efficiency of the economies.
It seems that correcting both externalities is welfare enhancing with respect to enacting the
single policies alone. The question is, however, what is the optimal mix of these policies? If we
use GDP to compare the policy mixes, we find lower stabilisation costs if we complement the
environmental policy with an R&D policy that internalise both knowledge externalities. If
instead, we compare the policy scenarios using discounted utility, which is a more appropriate
indicator of welfare than GDP, we obtain an important result: the preferred policy mix (in most
regions) combines the Stabilisation policy with a policy to correct knowledge market
externalities in the energy R&D sector alone. We thus find evidence to support the idea to
combine a stabilisation policy with a policy to support energy R&D only.
So far, the debate on the optimal policy mix has been intense but vague. With this paper we
have introduced a more sophisticated approach to describe knowledge dynamics by providing
insights to the modelling community. We have also produced a first set of results that give
substance to policy discussions.
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Appendix. Model Equations and List of Variables.
In this Appendix we reproduce the main equations of the model. For a full description of the model please
refer to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007). The list of variables is reported at the end. In each region,
indexed by n, a social planner maximises the following utility function:
W ( n) =
U [C (n, t ), L(n, t )] R(t ) = L(n, t ){ log [c(n, t )]}R (t ) ,
(A1)

∑

∑

t

t

where t are 5-year time spans and the pure time preference discount factor is given by:
t

R (t ) =

∏ [1 + ρ (v)]

−5

,

(A2)

v =0

where the pure rate of time preference ρ(v) is assumed to decline over time. Moreover, c(n, t ) =

C (n, t )
is
L(n, t )

per capita consumption.
Economic module
The budget constraint defines consumption as net output less investments:

C (n, t ) = Y (n, t ) − I C (n, t ) − I R& D , EN (n, t ) − I R& D , KL (n, t )

− ∑ j I R& D , j (n, t ) − ∑ j I j (n, t ) − ∑ j O&M j (n, t )

(A3)

Where j denotes energy technologies.
Output is produced via a nested CES function that combines a capital-labour aggregate and energy;
capital and labour are obtained from a CES function. The climate damage Ω reduces gross output; to
obtain net output we subtract the costs of the fuels f and of CCS:

Y (n, t ) =

[

TFP(n, t ) α Y ( n ) ⋅ KLS ρY + (1 − α Y ( n )) ⋅ ES (n, t )ρY
−

∑ (P (n, t )X
f

f

]

1 / ρY

Ω(n, t )

f ,extr

(n, t ) + Pfint (t )X f ,netimp (n, t ))

.

(A4)

− PCCS (n, t )CCS (n, t )
Total factor productivity TFP (n, t ) evolves exogenously with time.
Energy services are an aggregate of energy and a stock of knowledge combined with a CES function:

[

ES (n, t ) = α HE (n )HE ( n, t ) ρ ES + α EN (n )EN ( n, t ) ρ ES

]

1 / ρ EN

.

(A5)

Energy is a combination of electric and non-electric energy:
EN (n, t ) = α EL EL( n, t ) ρ EN + α NEL NEL( n, t ) ρ EN 1/ ρ EN .

(A6)

[

]

Each factor is further decomposed into several sub-components. Figure 2 portrays a graphical illustration
of the energy sector. Factors are aggregated using CES, linear and Leontief production functions.
Capital-labour services are obtained aggregating a capital-labour input and a knowledge stock with a CES
function:

[

KLS (n, t ) = α HKL (n )HKL( n, t ) ρ KLS + α KL (n )KL( n, t ) ρ KLS

]

1 / ρ KL

(A7)
The capital-labour input is a CES combination of capital and labour. Labour is assumed to be equal to
population and evolves exogenously.

[

KL(n, t ) = α K (n )K C ( n, t ) ρ KL + α L (n )L( n, t ) ρ KL

]

1 / ρ KL

(A8)

Final good capital accumulates following the standard perpetual rule:
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K C (n, t + 1) = K C (n, t )(1 − δ C ) + I C (n, t ) .

(A9)

New ideas which contribute to the stock of energy knowledge, Z HE (n, t ) , are produced using R&D
investments, I R & D , EN (n, t ) , together with the previously cumulated knowledge stock HE (n, t ) :

Z HE (n, t ) = a I HE (n, t ) b HE (n, t ) c HKL(n, t ) d ⋅

(A10)

Similarly, new ideas in the non-energy sector are generated as follows:

Z HKL (n, t ) = f I HKL (n, t ) g HKL(n, t ) h HE (n, t ) i

(A11)

The two knowledge stocks evolve as follows:

HE(n, t + 1 ) = HE ( n, t )(1 − δ ) + Z HE (n, t )

(A12)

HKL(n, t + 1 ) = HKL ( n, t )(1 − δ ) + Z HKL (n, t )

(A13)

For illustrative purposes, we show how electricity is produced via capital, operation and maintenance and
resource use through a zero-elasticity Leontief aggregate:
(A14)
EL j (n, t ) = min{μn , j K j (n, t ) ;τ n , jO&M j (n, t );ς j X j , EL (n, t ) }.
Capital for electricity generation technologies accumulates as follows:
I ( n, t )
,
K j (n, t + 1) = K j ( n, t )(1 − δ j ) + j
SC j ( n, t )

(A15)

where, for selected technologies, the new capital investment cost SC(n,t) decreases with the world
cumulated installed capacity by means of Learning-by-Doing:
− log 2 PR j
.
(A16)
SC j ( n, t ) = B j ( n )∑ ∑ K j (n, t )
t

n

Operation and maintenance is treated as an investment that fully depreciates every year. The resources
employed in electricity production are subtracted from output in equation A3 and A4. Their prices are
calculated endogenously using a reduced-form cost function that allows for non-linearity in both the
depletion effect and in the rate of extraction:

[

]ψ

Pf (n, t ) = χ f ( n ) + π f (n ) Q f (n, t − 1) Q f (n, t )

f

(n )

(A17)

where Q f is cumulative extraction of fuel f :

Q f (n, t − 1) = Q f (n,0) +

∑

t −1
s =0

X f , extr (n, s ) .

(A18)

Each country covers consumption of fuel f , X f (n, t ) , by either domestic extraction or imports,
X f , netimp (n, t ) , or by a combination of both. If the country is a net exporter, X f , netimp (n, t ) is negative.
X f (n, t ) = X f , extr (n, t ) + X f , netimp (n, t )

(A19)

Climate Module
GHGs emissions from combustion of fossil fuels are derived by applying stoichiometric coefficients to
the total amount of fossil fuels utilised minus the amount of CO2 sequestered:
(A20)
CO2 (n, t ) =
ω f ,CO2 X f (n, t ) − CCS (n, t ) .

∑

f

When a cap on emission (CAP) is included we have an additional equation, constraining emissions, given
the possibility to sell and buy permits:
CO 2 (n, t ) = CAP ( n, t ) + NIP ( n, t )

(A21)

In addition, carbon permits revenues/expenses enter the budget constraint:

C (n, t ) = Y (n, t ) − I C (n, t ) − I R & D , EN (n, t ) − I R & D , KL (n, t )
−

∑I

j R&D, j

(n, t ) − ∑ j I j (n, t ) − ∑ j O&M j (n, t ) − p (t )NIP (n, t )

(A3’)

The damage function impacting output varies with global temperature:
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Ω( n , t ) =

1

(

1 + θ1, nT (t ) + θ 2, nT (t )

2

)

.

(A22)

Temperature increases through augmented radiating forcing F(t):
T (t + 1) = T (t ) + σ 1{ F (t + 1) − λT (t ) − σ 2 [T (t ) − TLO (t )]}

(A23)

which in turn depends on CO2 concentrations:
PI
F (t ) = η log M AT (t ) / M AT
− log(2) + O (t ) ,

(A24)

caused by emissions from fuel combustion and land use change:
M AT (t + 1) =
CO2 (n, t ) + LU j (t ) + φ11M AT (t ) + φ21M UP (t ) ,

(A25)

{ [

]

∑[

}

]

n

M UP (t + 1) = φ22 M UP (t ) + φ12 M AT (t ) + φ32 M LO (t ) ,
M LO (t + 1) = φ33 M LO (t ) + φ23 M UP (t ) .

(A26)
(A27)
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